1	COURT OF APPEALS		
2	STATE OF NEW YORK		
3			
4	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,		
5	Respondent,		
6	-against- NO. 43		
7	JAIME LOPEZ-MENDOZA, (papers sealed)		
8	Appellant.		
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York May 2, 2019		
10	Before:		
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA		
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN		
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA		
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN		
15			
16	Appearances:		
17	CHRISTINA A. SWARNS, ESQ. OFFICE OF THE APPELLATE DEFENDER		
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25	Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber		



1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on this 2 afternoon's calendar is appeal number 43. It is the People 3 of the State of New York v. Jaime Lopez-Mendoza. 4 Good afternoon, counsel. 5 MS. SWARNS: Good afternoon. With this court's 6 permission, I'd like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal. 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have two minutes. 8 MS. SWARNS: Thank you. 9 Christina Swarns for the Office of the Appellate 10 Defender on behalf of Jaime Lopez-Mendoza. 11 This case raises the question of whether 12 Constitutionally effective counsel can pursue a theory of 13 defense that he knew or should have known would be proven 14 false by the prosecution's undisputed physical evidence. 15 JUDGE STEIN: Well, this is a - - - this is - - -16 this case, to me, is a little different than the previous 17 case, in terms of what we have on the record. We have this 18 sort of, what seems to me, an ambiguous discussion about 19 what trial counsel - - - had done in terms of 20 investigation. What he knew; what he didn't know. 2.1 conversations he may have had with his client about it. 2.2 - - - how can we decide this one on this record? 23 MS. SWARNS: Sure. So because there are 24 literally only two explanations for what - - - for 25 counsel's decision to pursue a defense that he should have

1	known would be proven false by the prosecution's undisputed
2	video evidence. So we know from the inception of this
3	case, counsel knew that the prosecution in this case had
4	video evidence. As it turned out and the defense
5	counsel pursued a theory of defense which was that Mr.
6	Lopez
7	JUDGE WILSON: I'm sorry, when when you sa
8	from the inception of the case, can you give me a date?
9	MS. SWARNS: I don't have a date in front of me,
10	but it was certainly in the V in the VDF, that the
11	prosecution had video evidence.
12	JUDGE WILSON: But it's two days after the
13	incident that the defendant testifies in front of the grand
14	jury, correct?
15	MS. SWARNS: That's right.
16	JUDGE WILSON: Do we know whether counsel had the
17	video at that point?
18	MS. SWARNS: I don't think he had the video; he
19	had notice of the video.
20	JUDGE WILSON: Yeah, before that.
21	MS. SWARNS: Once he
22	JUDGE WILSON: Before that.
23	MS. SWARNS: Right.
24	JUDGE WILSON: You know that?
25	MS. SWARNS: No.

1	JUDGE WILSON: You do know that or you don't know			
2	that?			
3	MS. SWARNS: I don't do I know whether he			
4	had seen the video before that or do I			
5	JUDGE WILSON: No, do you know whether he had the			
6	video			
7	MS. SWARNS: No.			
8	JUDGE WILSON: by the 29th of December?			
9	MS. SWARNS: I don't know the answer to that, but			
10	what I do know is that from early on, let's say then, in			
11	the beginning of the case, before this case went to trial,			
12	counsel knew that the that the prosecution had video			
13	evidence. And counsel made a decision at the outset to go			
14	to this trial and present a theory of defense which was			
15	that Mr. Lopez-Mendoza engaged in consensual sex with the			
16	complainant at 2:38.			
17	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel			
18	MS. SWARNS: The video			
19	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: how do we analyze			
20	defense counsel's attempt to strategically recognize this			
21	man's testimony before the grand jury and what he did at			
22	trial?			
23	MS. SWARNS: So the video, of course, disproved			
24	the 2:38 a.m. defense. So counsel's obligation, right,			
25	before they went to trial was to, A, have reviewed all of			

the evidence that was - - - that was that he knew to be in the prosecution's possession, that he knew or should have known that the prosecution was likely to use in its prosecution against Mr. Lopez-Mendoza, and then pursue a theory of defense that reconciled with all of the evidence that was known to him, or should have been known to him.

JUDGE WILSON: But how does he reconcile the grand jury testimony with the video?

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MS. SWARNS: Well, counsel had a bunch of options, right. In this case, counsel opened and said, that his - - his client was going to testify to this 2:38 a.m. consensual defense - - consensual sex defense. That wasn't an obligation on counsel.

JUDGE WILSON: Well - - - I wasn't asking all the different ways that he could not reconcile them. I want to know how he could reconcile them.

MS. SWARNS: Well, that assumes that counsel was locked into pursuing a theory of defense which was consensual sex at 2:38.

JUDGE WILSON: Well, which was consistent with the grand jury testimony.

MS. SWARNS: Right. But this was also a case that was riddled with reasonable doubt. We have a complainant who was unquestionably intoxicated. We have a complainant who, on the evening of the offense, was



committed to the idea, inexplicably committed to the idea, 1 2 that the assailant was in room 206, even after she accused 3 4 JUDGE WILSON: And he did bring all that out at 5 trial. 6 MS. SWARNS: He did. And so there was - - - this 7 is a case that was riddled with reasonable doubt. So 8 counsel made a choice to pursue a theory of defense that he 9 knew or should have known would have - - - would have 10 absolutely failed in front of this jury, in the face of other alternative dedanses, like reasonable doubt, that 11 12 wouldn't have failed that way. 13 We also know that at the outset of the trial 14 proceedings, the court in this case offered Mr. Lopez-15 Mendoza - - - a plea, right. There was a plea on the table 16 from the court of five years, plus five years PRS. Counsel 17 could have urged his client to - - - to seriously urge his 18 client to take that plea. 19 JUDGE WILSON: And do we know that he didn't? 20 JUDGE FEINMAN: But you don't know that he didn't 21 do that - - -22 MS. SWARNS: But what we do know - - -23 JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - and - - - and that brings 24 me to the same question I asked in the last case is, don't 25 we need a 440 here to flesh out this record?

MS. SWARNS: Well, what we know is that what counsel actually did in this case, the decision that counsel actually made, was to pursue a defense that he knew or should have known would absolutely be disproven by the prosecution's evidence. The only way he could have made the decision to pursue that defense was either, A, by failing to - - to watch the video and recognize that that video ran in complete conflict with the defense that he had chosen, or B, that he did watch the video, and then presented it anyway.

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Whether you choose route A or you choose route B, counsel's decision here was objectively unreasonable.

JUDGE STEIN: But what - - - what, if any, weight is counsel permitted to give what his client tells him about - - so here he's got the - - - these hundreds of hours of video. And he doesn't know until he's right there at trial that supposedly these particular time frames will show his client in a - - in another part of the building.

So is he - - - is he not permitted to take into account what his client tells him, in terms of the value of his going through those hundreds of hours of video? Is - - is it ineffective for him to - - - to - - - to take that into consideration?

MS. SWARNS: No, he's required to take that into consideration. Counsel, of course, has to consult with his



client.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay So how do we know that that conversation between him and his client didn't take place?

MS. SWARNS: We don't know that.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So why - - -

MS. SWARNS: But even - - -

JUDGE STEIN: - - so even that what a 440 hearing is for?

MS. SWARNS: No, because even if - - - let's just assume that Mr. Lopez-Mendoza was emphatic about the idea that what he - - - what happened was that he engaged in consensual sex at 2:38 a.m. Counsel's duty was then to effectuate that defense, to push forward that his client's chosen defense in recognition of all of the evidence that was known to him with - - in recognition of all of the evidence that was going to be presented against his client.

You can't blindly accept what your client says and pursue a defense and - - - and close your eyes to the evidence that you know the prosecution is going to present. If he knew that this was the defense that his client was wedded to, and he knew that the prosecution was going to introduce this video, then it was incumbent upon counsel to - - to aggressively seek to - - - for example, exclude the video, right. Make a challenge on reliability grounds, admissibility grounds. Challenge chain of custody. Make a

meaningful effort to effectuate the defense that his client has urged him to pursue. None of that happened here, and none of that happened here in a case that wasn't - - -

Mow - - - the - - - the lawyer picks the strategy regardless of what the client says, right, ultimately. We don't know what really happened here, and - - - and he doesn't - - - I mean, he can choose to take a - - - I'm not saying this is a silly defense, but let's say the client wants some silly defense, he or she may choose to pursue that after discussing it with the client or not.

MS. SWARNS: That's right, and if --- whether it's ---

JUDGE FEINMAN: So - - - so - - -

MS. SWARNS: So it sort of brings me back to point one, which is whether Mr. Mendoza urged this defense on him or whether the client chose this defense. There are only one of two ways - - - and my red light is on - - - that - - - that they could have gotten to the place where this - - - this defense was presented to this jury. A, they didn't know that the evidence - - - that the prosecution was going to present and that video would completely undermine that defense, or B, they did know that that was going to happen, and they - - - presented it anyway, which is inexcusable and objectively unreasonable.

JUDGE GARCIA: He didn't have a lot of choices here, really. I mean, one, he had the grand jury testimony he had to deal with. And two, which we haven't mentioned yet, there was DNA evidence, so he was really limited in - - it's a consensual encounter and then I have to fit it in a time, and there's all this videotape. So isn't it really, as I think has been suggested, why did you do that? I mean, what other options did he have? What was the client telling him? All of these are hearing issues.

MS. SWARNS: Well, again, I think in terms of the

MS. SWARNS: Well, again, I think in terms of the question of the impact of the DNA. I just want to take a moment; I know my red light is on - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may.

MS. SWARNS: - - - to flesh this out. So what we know is this case was riddled with reasonable doubt. This jury acquitted Mr. Lopez-Mendoza on the criminal sexual act charge, right. And that, obviously, is a repudiation of the complainant's testimony, because the complainant at trial testified that she was the victim of oral vaginal contact, in combination with - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But he was convicted of first-degree rape.

MS. SWARNS: Yes, and in combination - - - I just want to finish my thought - - - in combination with the absence, right, of saliva or DNA. So that's how they get



to the acquittal on the criminal sexual act.

So then you have rape. And what the jury was confronted with with respect to rape was a complainant, whose credibility they have found to be compromised, and Mr. Lopez-Mendoza, whose defense is perhaps - - - self-serving, right, of consensual sex.

But then what happens here is that defense is completely destroyed by the video. As soon as the prosecution presents the video, the defense, right, to counterbalance the questionable complainant's theory, because they've already acquitted on one count, right, is destroyed. So you have defense counsel saying, disregard my - - my defense.

You have the prosecutor, in her closing argument, walking this jury step-by-step through the video, that completely undermines the theory of defense. You have the prosecutor, in her closing argument, spending her time pointing out how the defense was destroyed by this video. And we know, without question, that those things had a profound effect on this jury, because the first note the jury sends out asks for a bunch of things, including the prosecutor's summation and the video.

So there's no question in the context of this weak case - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Does - - - does - - - does the



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grand jury testimony get in, if he doesn't testify? 1 2 MS. SWARNS: No, I don't believe it does, right. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: So he could have avoided in the 4 opening making any reference to the time frame? 5 MS. SWARNS: Absolutely. He could have presented 6 a reasonable doubt defense, right? This - - - if - - -7 Constitutionally effective counsel should be making these 8 decisions before the start of trial, right, taking into 9 account the reality of this videotape in the context of this claim of consensual sex immediately after they go in 10 the room. That is the time at which those decisions should 11 12 have been made. 13 Counsel clearly did not do that. We know that 14 from this record, because again, only one of two things 15 happened. He watched that video and inexcusably presented 16 a defense that he knew or should have known would have 17 blown up in his face in court. Or he didn't watch the 18 video and he presented a strategy that was completely borne 19 in the blind. 20 Thank you. 21 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 2.2 Counsel? 23 MS. AXELROD: Good afternoon, Your Honors, may it 24 please the court, my name is Susan Axelrod. I represent

the respondent. I just want to set the record straight on

a couple of things.

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At the time that the defendant testified in the grand jury, there had been no indictment, and there had been no VDF. The defense did not know about the videotape. I'm not sure that the People knew about the existence of the videotape. Obviously, it's a hotel and it's likely to - - to be something that exists. But when the defendant went into the grand jury, he - - - the defense had not seen the videotape.

The defendant, however, is an employee of the hotel, and one would have expected that he might have been aware that there were actually cameras all over where the employees worked. This - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: We know, though, the opposing counsel closed by positing a - - - a conundrum. Assuming - - assuming the videotape was not watched in its entirety, you have a choice between an incompetent investigation, or assuming it was watched, then you have a choice with incompetent representation. But it's - - - it's inexplicable not to watch the video, I guess, is the core argument. Otherwise you're on - - your - - you, by I mean, your argument is on the horns of that dilemma.

MS. AXELROD: Well, first of all, on this record, it's unclear as to whether or not he watched the videotape.

And we've - - - we're all drawing inferences from that.



1	One thing that I would like to point out is that at the -
2	_
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, how can that be, given the
4	colloquy? I mean, given the colloquy
5	MS. AXELROD: The colloquy, he never said he
6	didn't watch the videotape.
7	JUDGE RIVERA: But but but the
8	prosecutor insists over and over.
9	MS. AXELROD: Well
10	JUDGE RIVERA: I told him about it. He's had it
11	I told him a month ago.
12	MS. AXELROD: That doesn't ans
13	JUDGE RIVERA: The judge asked, did you watch it
14	MS. AXELROD: And he didn't answer.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: And he finesses it.
16	JUDGE WILSON: He says
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Right. And if he had watched it,
18	one would think he would say, of course, I watched it.
19	MS. AXELROD: Well, maybe.
20	JUDGE WILSON: At at 219
21	MS. AXELROD: But again
22	JUDGE WILSON: Excuse me for a second.
23	MS. AXELROD: I'm sorry.
24	JUDGE WILSON: At 219, the court asks, have you
25	seen the video? And the answer is yes.

1	MS. AXELROD: The the	
2	JUDGE WILSON: So I'm I'm confused about	
3	what whether he saw it and when he saw it and	
4	MS. AXELROD: Well, I	
5	JUDGE WILSON: what happened.	
6	MS. AXELROD: He it was definitely give it	
7	to given to him and	
8	JUDGE WILSON: He was asked "seen" which is	
9	ambiguous perhaps?	
10	MS. AXELROD: The I think the record is a	
11	little bit ambiguous, which is one of the reasons we were	
12	arguing that you need to set have a 440 to understan	
13	it.	
14	JUDGE RIVERA: I thought he said that he had	
15	received it.	
16	MS. AXELROD: Yes, but he	
17	JUDGE RIVERA: I thought the question was, do yo	
18	have it? Have you gotten it? You're not arguing that he	
19	didn't get it.	
20	MS. AXELROD: I'm not arguing that, Judge.	
21	JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, not you. Isn't that what	
22	the judge is the colloquy?	
23	MS. AXELROD: Yes, but the other part of the	
24	colloquy is	
25	JUDGE RIVERA: But if he said, I saw it, we	

wouldn't be in this - - -1 2 MS. AXELROD: I don't know. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - kind of an argument. 4 MS. AXELROD: Oh, oh, that, yeah, absolutely not. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: He doesn't expressly say I saw the 6 video. JUDGE STEIN: But what - - - what - - - weren't 7 8 they - - - weren't they primarily focusing on the - - - the 9 redacted video that the People wanted to offer into 10 evidence? 11 MS. AXELROD: Exactly. This is a truncated 12 conversation, not about what defense counsel did or didn't 13 do, or how he spoke to or didn't speak to his client. 14 whether or not he was entitled to see this particular 15 exhibit before it went into evidence. Now - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but the whole - - - the whole 17 point is that the prosecutor is saying, I told him a month 18 ago that the video does not bear out the grand jury 19 testimony. It's not hours of video. There's only a 20 certain period of time that's at play. 2.1 MS. AXELROD: Except when you see that videotape 22 from what the - - - Mr. Fong (ph.), who was the one who put 23 that tape together, said there's twenty-six cameras, all 24 running at the same time, and they all pop up at the screen

at the same time. Which means you have, even in a short -

- - even in an hour's worth of time, you have twenty-six 1 2 hours right there all popping up at you. 3 Now it is possible, because he was speaking with 4 a hotel employee, who had worked there, who did not have a 5 criminal record, that he actually made the - - - the 6 decision that he was going to believe, or put faith, in 7 what his client was telling him, which was that the video 8 wasn't all that significant. Why he didn't seem to 9 understand what the prosecutor said, we don't know, because 10 there was no - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, I'm sorry. Is this argument 12 now that if your client tells you no, no, no, this is 13 definitely the way this went down, that that excuses - - -14 that you may not look at the relevant parts of the video or 15 you don't look at the video? 16 MS. AXELROD: Again, Judge, we don't know that he 17 didn't look at the video. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: Twenty-six hours sounds a lot less 19 than hundreds. 20 MS. AXELROD: We don't know that he didn't look 21 at the videotape. What I'm saying is in this circumstance, 22 with this particular defendant, who actually - - -23 propelled his testimony - - -

even assume - - - let's - - - counsel makes, I think, an

JUDGE RIVERA: But I'm saying, let's - - - let's

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1	interesting point. Assume he did look at it.
2	MS. AXELROD: Did or did not?
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Assume he did look at the video.
4	MS. AXELROD: Did?
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
6	MS. AXELROD: Okay.
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Then what explains the course that
8	he took?
9	MS. AXELROD: He only had one defense in this
10	case.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Then why does he switch after this
12	I'm not understanding that.
13	MS. AXELROD: I don't under he doesn't
14	switch defenses. He opens on a consensual sexual act, wher
15	the defendant goes into the when the defendant helps
16	the victim and her boyfriend into the hotel. He sums up or
17	a consensual sexual act, when the
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, that that aligns with
19	the grand jury testimony. I'm not asking about that. I'm
20	talking about the way of the course of consent
21	MS. AXELROD: But that's his defense throughout
22	the trial. He never deviates from his defense, because
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24	JUDGE RIVERA: Why does he say the client's going
25	to testify and then not?

MS. AXELROD: That was a - - - that was a misstep, and it was a misstep that attorneys sometimes make.

JUDGE RIVERA: All right.

MS. AXELROD: But this court has not - - - with

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MS. AXELROD: But this court has not - - - with very rare exception - - - has this court set aside a conviction, especially without a 440.10, on one misstep without looking at the rest of the record. When you look at this entire record, this defense attorney was very effective. He - - his objections to the DNA - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Could you - - - could you not have - - - could you not have used the grand jury testimony?

MS. AXELROD: And that was the other thing I wanted to clear up. We are entitled to use that testimony, even if the defendant does not testify. It's a - - - $\frac{1}{2}$

JUDGE WILSON: So why don't you say it's a misstep? Isn't - - - wouldn't it have been a reasonable - - - I mean, look, if I'm the defense attorney, I don't want my client on the stand, right, because he's going to get brutally cross-examined with the grand jury testimony, and I don't want the grand jury testimony in. And what do you know? Neither of those things happened. Is it possible by saying I'm going to call him, and then having the People rest, and then not calling him, I've accomplished that objective?

1	MS. AXELROD: Well, actually, that was something
2	that we raised in the Appellate Division and did not raise
3	here, but it's true there is there could have been
4	some rolling of the dice gambling on his part, where he
5	ended up exactly where he needed to be, which was the very
6	damning grand jury testimony wasn't introduced into
7	evidence. And I'm sorry.
8	JUDGE WILSON: And don't we need to examine the
9	lawyer to find out if he's a gambler?
10	MS. AXELROD: Well, it's our position that given
11	the fact that there was only one defense to be had, this
12	court can find that no matter what the 440.10 delivered,
13	that the defendant still had meaningful his
14	meaningful right to a fair trial was protected. But
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Can you explain to me why
16	why you say the grand jury testimony could've gotten in,
17	even if he didn't take the stand?
18	MS. AXELROD: Because he it's an admission
19	by the defendant, whose a party opponent
20	JUDGE RIVERA: So why not then why would
21	not why wouldn't the prosecutor use that?
22	MS. AXELROD: At the point where this trial was
23	going
24	JUDGE RIVERA: That and the video?
25	MS. AXELROD: the way it was, there was no

1 need for it. Had the defense switched and said, actually 2 there was a consensual act at 3 - - 3:30, then the 3 prosecutor would most likely have put that in to show that 4 he was switching horses midstream to show that - - - that 5 this was an eleventh-hour defense, and therefore one that shouldn't be credited. 6 7 JUDGE RIVERA: It's hard - - - it's hard - - -8 it's hard to fathom that something that is so devastating, 9 the prosecutor's not going to put it in, even if they think 10 that it's going really well. 11 MS. AXELROD: That was a - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: If - - - if you're correct. I'
- - I'm going with your argument that the grand jury
testimony gets in regardless of whether or not the
defendant takes the stand.

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 $$\operatorname{MS.}$ AXELROD: And I'm very - - - confident to stand on that argument.

JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no, I'm just - - - I'm - - I'm going with that. I'm not - - -

MS. AXELROD: Different prosecutors have different ways of trying cases. This particular prosecutor in this case, in the way it unfolded in front of her, made a decision that she did not need to put the grand jury testimony in. And as it turned out, she was right, because she got a conviction.

Now I also want to talk about the - - - the fact that there was an acquittal on one of the charges as if that suggested that the jury didn't actually believe the - - - the witness and would've even gone further, if defense counsel had chosen a different strategy. One thing about - - about the - - - that particular sex act was, as she testified, she was awake for it, and didn't say no, because she thought it was her boyfriend.

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Defense counsel argued, on summation, she was not physically helpless at that point, because she was actually in a position to say no, and mistaken identity is not the same as physical - - helplessness. So there's actually a legal reason why this jury would've acquitted on one and convicted on the other, and still very much credited this particular witness. And in fact, the jury clearly was listening to and crediting defense counsel in this, because they considered his arguments very carefully, and they acted on it very carefully.

Getting back to his overall competence, this attorney, his cross-examination of the - - - of the victim - - - allowed him to make the - - - the arguments on summation that he did. He cross-examined her about her intoxication. He cross-examined her about how her clothes came off, in order to show the unlikelihood that that could have happened if she wasn't awake and consenting. He



cross-examined her about the positions that she and the 1 2 defendant must have been in, again, in order to highlight 3 those differences. He called his own witness, the EMT, to 4 come in and say, actually the bed was made, which would 5 have contradicted everything that she said. 6 He called a witness to talk about - - - to - - -7 who took a photograph of the - - - the rug outside of the 8 garbage area, to show that it had the same colors as the 9 rug inside the hotel room, in order to try to dampen the 10 effect of that. He objected to the DNA in a way that previewed this court's decision in John. He also objected 11 12 to the introduction of the fiber testimony by arguing 13 foundation. 14 15 defense attorney.

This defense attorney was a thoroughly competent

JUDGE FEINMAN: So - - - so you mentioned the Is there anything you want to say about that point? DNA.

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MS. AXELROD: I think that what we did in - - in below, in terms of what the - - - the expert testified to was enough for this court to draw the inference that we satisfied John. She clearly had gone back to the raw data and - - -

JUDGE STEIN: What - - - what - - - what was that inference based on? That she said "we" or - - -

MS. AXELROD: No, it - - - that's part of it, but



what - - - what I - - - that's not the inference I'm asking you to draw. There I think we absolutely on the - - - the combined DNA, we absolutely satisfy John. I mean, she talked about how she reviewed everything and she came to a decision on what numbers should be the alleles. Where - - - where there was not as much detail on what she did was the - - - the buccal swabs of the defendant and the victim. And our argument there is, it - - - my light is on; can I just - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, of course.

MS. AXELROD: It just seems completely inconsistent with the way she behaved, that she would not have gone back, and done the same thing with those alleles, and the only reason that testimony didn't - - - come out, was one, it was before John; we didn't know we had to do it, and two, the defense attorney wasn't really questioning those conclusions.

JUDGE STEIN: If we disagree with you on that, how can we find it harmless based on all the - - - cross-examination of the victim, and this - - - all this other testimony that you've just recounted.

MS. AXELROD: Because the defendant, when he is arrested by the police, right at the beginning, says that he had consensual relationship - - - he said he had a sexual relationship with her and that it was consensual.



So the defendant, out of his own mouth, already took identity and identification out of the equation, and that's all the DNA was - - - was going to. And that's why the Appellate Division also found that to be harmless.

I see my time is up. I just ask the court to rely, for the remainder of my arguments, on my brief, and to affirm the judgment. Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.

Counsel?

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MS. SWARNS: So I begin by just - - - making clear that we've raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We have not raised a denial of counsel claim. We are not obligated to prove a complete absence of advocacy on behalf of Mr. Lopez-Mendoza in order to succeed on our claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

And this is a case that was riddled with reasonable doubt. Even if the grand jury minutes came in, what we know is this was an intoxicated complainant, who spent the evening banging on the room next door, declaring that the assailant was in there, even after Mr. Lopez-Mendoza was sent off of the floor by the hotel security. We know that this complainant told EMS right after - - well, on the evening of the - - - the alleged offense, that the assault occurred right after she was given access to the room.



We know that this complainant declared that she saw - - - she testified at trial that she saw the complainant come under the covers of her bed, but EMS, when they went into that room on the night of the alleged assault, said the bedding was not even disturbed. We know that this complainant testified to oral vaginal contact, and there was neither saliva nor DNA found on her.

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This is a case that was absolutely riddled with reasonable doubt. So this is the - - - so a reasonable doubt defense was available to counsel here, an effective counsel who was aware and working and reconciling his defense with what he knew or should have known to be the reality of the videotape in this case, would have considered pursuing a reasonable doubt defense.

Again, there are only one of two things happened here. It is, as aptly put, it's either incompetent representation or incompetent investigation. Those are the only two roads here. There's no reasonable - - - objectively reasonable basis for counsel to pursue a defense that he knew or should have known would be disproven by videotape evidence, of all things, of videotape evidence by - - - presented by the prosecution. That is ineffective assistance of counsel.

And for those reasons, we ask that Your Honors reverse Mr. Lopez-Mendoza's conviction.



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.

MS. SWARNS: Thank you.



1		CERTIFICATION	
2			
3	I, K	aren Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing	
4	transcript of	proceedings in the Court of Appeals of The	
5	People of the State of New York v. Jaime Lopez-Mendoza, No.		
6	43 was prepared using the required transcription equipment		
7	and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.		
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